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ABSTRACT
Justice Antonin Scalia is among the most famous Supreme Court Justices in
history. He is known for his originalism and conservative positions, as well as his
witty and acerbic legal opinions. One of the reasons Justice Scalia’s opinions are so
memorable is his effective use of rhetorical devices, which convey colorful images
and understandable ideas. One might expect that such powerful opinions would be
effective in shaping the law, but Justice Scalia’s judicial philosophy was often too
conservative to persuade a majority of his fellow Justices on the Supreme Court. Fur-
ther, his regular criticisms of his Supreme Court colleagues were not conducive to
building majority support for his reasoning. Hoping to still have a lasting impact on
the law, Justice Scalia seemed to direct his rhetoric at a different audience. Instead
of focusing on persuading his Supreme Court colleagues, Justice Scalia concentrated
on persuading the general public. Instead of shaping law in the traditional trickle-down
manner, Justice Scalia sought to shape it from the bottom up.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most prolific, acerbic, and famous Supreme Court Justices has re-
cently passed away. Justice Antonin Scalia was known for his intellect and wit, as
well as his ultra-conservative approach to legal issues before the Supreme Court.
Although he was in the minority throughout much of his judicial career, Justice
Scalia had a profound impact on the law. Indeed, Judge Richard Posner has described
him as “the most influential justice of the last quarter-century.”1 Further, upon Justice
Scalia’s passing, his Supreme Court colleagues—legal giants themselves—painted
him as “a towering figure who will be remembered as one of the most important
figures in the history of the Supreme Court and a scholar who deeply influenced our
legal culture,”2 “a jurist of captivating brilliance and wit,”3 “a towering intellect; a
legal giant,”4 “a legal titan,”5 and “one of the most transformational Supreme Court
Justices of our nation.”6 Justice Sotomayor remarked that “[h]e left an indelible mark
on our history,”7 and Justice Kennedy stated that, “[i]n years to come any history of
the Supreme Court will, and must, recount the wisdom, scholarship and technical
brilliance that Justice Scalia brought to the [C]ourt.”8 Chief Justice Roberts declared
that Justice Scalia’s passing is “a great loss to the [C]ourt and the country.”9
Perhaps realizing that he would often be in the minority in Supreme Court
decisionmaking, Justice Scalia took a unique approach to shaping the law. Instead
of using his judicial opinions to try to persuade his Supreme Court colleagues of his
positions, Justice Scalia seemed to try to shape the law from the bottom up. He em-
ployed rhetorical stratagems to reach a broader audience in his opinions. For example,
in the recent Obamacare case of King v. Burwell,10 the dissenting Justice Scalia com-
pared the majority’s reasoning to “somersaults of statutory interpretation” that would
“be cited by litigants endlessly, to the confusion of honest jurisprudence.”11 Through
this approach of using accessible language and imagery, Justice Scalia targeted
1 See Richard A. Posner, The Court of Celebrity, NEW REPUBLIC (May 4, 2011), https://
newrepublic.com/article/87880/supreme-court-burger-blackmum-media-celebrity [https://
perma.cc/64X7-YCKE].
2 Supreme Court Justices Remember Scalia, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2016, 2:08 PM),
http://www.nytimes.com/live/supreme-court-justice-antonin-scalia-dies-at-79/supreme-court
-justices-remember-scalia/ (statement of Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr.).
3 Id. (statement of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg).
4 Id. (statement of Justice Clarence Thomas).
5 Id. (statement of Justice Stephen G. Breyer).
6 Id. (statement of Justice Elena Kagan).
7 Id. (statement of Justice Sonia Sotomayor).
8 Id. (statement of Justice Anthony M. Kennedy).
9 Id. (statement of Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.).
10 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
11 Id. at 2507.
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average Americans to have an effect on the law, whether that be through legislation
or political pressure on judges and other relevant decisionmakers.
This Article outlines Justice Scalia’s unique approach to impacting the law. Part
I describes the typical role and power of judicial decisions. It explains that most
judges use their written opinions to carefully describe the legal bases for their
decisions. Part II explains how rhetoric is employed in crafting persuasive judicial
opinions and in particular describes the roles of metaphors, colloquialisms, and
humor in persuading audiences. Part III studies Justice Scalia’s use of these rhetori-
cal stratagems in his opinions, and Part IV asserts that, unlike most Justices, Scalia
layered his rhetoric with harsh criticisms of the Court and his colleagues. Although
Justice Scalia’s written opinions are lively and colorful, and although his opinions
strategically employ rhetorical devices more effectively and in ways that his col-
leagues’ opinions do not, Justice Scalia’s opinions often deride other Supreme Court
Justices—the very people that Justice Scalia had to persuade to create a majority
decision on his issues. Part V argues that, instead of directing his persuasion at his
colleagues on the Court, Scalia primarily attempted to influence public opinion by
directing his rhetoric at the general public, including legislators, practicing lawyers,
legal scholars, and other influential persons. Part VI suggests that, instead of just
wanting to be known as a great linguist, Justice Scalia attempted to impact the law
in a nontraditional manner. He was working on writing a legacy in the law. Justice
Scalia realized that it would be difficult for him to impact the law one majority
decision at a time—primarily because he often did not reach the same legal conclu-
sions as his colleagues. He therefore directed his accomplished rhetoric at the
general public. He attempted to make an end-run around his colleagues—foregoing
attempts to marshal the Court—and shape the law in a roundabout fashion. He
sought to shape the law from the bottom up. Justice Scalia crafted entertaining and
readable opinions that could interest and persuade the average American. He effec-
tively employed metaphors, colloquialisms, and humor to convey his reasoning to
the lay public and create a grassroots movement to shape the law. Now that Justice
Scalia has passed, he leaves this legacy behind.
I. THE FUNCTIONS OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS
Judicial opinions serve a variety of functions and are the primary means of
judicial communication.12 Serving such an important role, it is imperative that these
opinions, whether for the majority, or a concurrence or dissent, are persuasive.
Depending on the audience to which a judicial opinion is directed, though, the ap-
proach a judge might take will vary. Opinions are generally addressed to a number
of audiences, including the litigants, lawyers, lower courts, other judges, and the
12 See HAIG BOSMAJIAN, METAPHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS 33 (Robert K.
Burdette ed., 1992).
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public at large.13 These are important factors to consider in determining how to
effectively construct a persuasive opinion.
Majority opinions comprise the bulk of judicial opinions. One of their primary
functions is to justify the outcome of the case to the litigants and their attorneys.14
At the Supreme Court level, majority opinions have even greater significance and
therefore multivarious functions. Unlike most district court opinions, Supreme Court
opinions can affect legal decisions across the country for decades to come and are
read by a broader audience. As with appellate majority opinions generally, these
opinions are often directed at persuading a judge’s colleagues.15 At the Supreme
Court, opinions are circulated among the Justices’ chambers, providing Justices with
an opportunity to join the majority opinion or write a supplementary opinion question-
ing the majority’s reasoning.16 These opinions also are written to give guidance to
lower courts and to potential litigants who may have questions about the constitu-
tionality of their actions.17 A clear judicial opinion will illustrate to lower court
judges how to analyze specific problems and the parameters for their decisions. By
providing a strong foundation for the ruling, and coherent reasoning, they can also
serve to satisfy the public that justice has been done and that the result was not
reached by partial or arbitrary reasoning.18 This aids in maintaining confidence in
the judiciary and consequently respect for the law.19 Concurrently, majority opinions
serve the function of preserving history and law through reaffirming precedent.20
They can also serve to convince the authors themselves that they have decided the
case correctly.21 Through the process of writing out an opinion and reviewing the
supplementary drafts of concurrences and dissents, a Justice has the chance to
clearly map out his reasoning and conclusion.22 Majority opinions become the law
of the land and thus should be built upon a foundation of strong reasoning so as to
provide guidance to lower courts and attorneys, and to maintain respect for the
Court and its jurisprudence.
13 See id. at 31.
14 See id. at 27.
15 See id. at 33.
16 See DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS
283–84 (5th ed. 2000).
17 See BOSMAJIAN, supra note 12, at 30.
18 See id.
19 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole
people by its example. . . . If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for
the law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.”); BOSMAJIAN,
supra note 12, at 30.
20 See BOSMAJIAN, supra note 12, at 30.
21 See id. at 28–29.
22 See id.
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While the majority opinion is often the most valuable to practicing attorneys
because it has the force of law, concurrences and dissents also serve key roles in
shaping the law. The circulation of draft opinions provides Justices with the oppor-
tunity to shift their votes and build further coalitions or catalyze fragmentation
within the Court.23 Drafts of dissents are sometimes converted into majority opin-
ions, and vice versa, after the Justices have had a chance to review their colleagues’
reasoning.24 Thus, persuasive opinions may be effective in changing the outcome of
an important case.
Judges write concurrences and dissents for varying reasons. Concurrences ex-
plain how the court’s decision could have been otherwise rationalized.25 In Justice
Stevens’s view, they are defensible because a compromised opinion would be mean-
ingless.26 They also may be written to send a signal to lower courts to guide them
in “the direction of Supreme Court policymaking,” or for egocentric or political
reasons.27 Dissents, on the other hand, function to demonstrate flaws the author per-
ceives in the majority’s legal analysis.28 They are also used to emphasize the limits
of a majority decision that perhaps sweeps unnecessarily broadly, or to provide lower
courts with practical guidance.29 According to Justice Ginsburg, the most effective
dissents stand on their own legal footing and spell out differences without jeopardiz-
ing collegiality, public respect for the Court, or confidence in the judiciary.30 Accord-
ing to Justice Brennan, the most enduring dissents are those that ring with rhetoric,
“straddl[ing] the worlds of literature and law.”31
II. EMPLOYING RHETORIC TO PERSUADE
The most effective judicial opinions employ rhetorical stratagems to achieve
persuasive effects. Just as in any discipline, there is an art to persuasion. A commu-
nicator can usefully employ rhetorical devices such as the metaphor, colloquialisms,
and humor to simplify complex issues, create a bond with his reader, and, perhaps
insidiously, mask his agenda.32 While effective in persuading, these can be dangerous
tools in that improper use of them may alienate or repel a reader, or even complicate
the issues.
23 See O’BRIEN, supra note 16, at 283–84.
24 See id.
25 See id. at 306.
26 See id.
27 Id. at 307.
28 See William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 430 (1986).
29 See id. (stating that a dissent can serve as “a sort of ‘damage control’ mechanism”).
30 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1196
(1992).
31 See Brennan, supra note 28, at 431.
32 See infra Parts II.A–C.
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A. Metaphors
The use of the metaphor is important in persuasive writing. Metaphors act to
represent one thing (the “tenor”) in terms of another (the “vehicle”) to direct a
reader’s perception of the tenor by aligning its meaning with that of the vehicle.33
Metaphors transport concepts from where they are normally located to somewhere
else where they are not usually found.34 Thus, a metaphor allows one to create cor-
respondences in the world which did not have prior existence.35 It “allows new
meanings to occur.”36 The consequence of the metaphor’s use as a transport device
is that it may introduce into the new context qualities derived from the old context.37
For instance, when Ronald Reagan vowed to fight the “communist cancer,” he
conjured up notions of sickness and death, as well as of continuous growth.38
In addition to creating new meaning, metaphors are used to help an audience
understand complex matters, simplifying the issues at hand.39 They may also add an
imaginative dimension to pique the audience’s interest and make the discussion
especially memorable.40 Additionally, metaphors create a bond between the commu-
nicator and audience because they jointly recognize that an illustrative metaphor is
being used.41 In this way, a communicator can create rapport with his audience through
the simple use of metaphor. According to Professor Joan Mulholland, metaphors may
also be used to set an agenda by injecting unanticipated undertones into a discussion.42
B. Colloquialisms
Colloquialisms are also useful for simplifying the issues and developing rapport
with an audience. In addition, they are useful for dismissing an opponent’s argu-
ment.43 Colloquialisms may appeal to an unsophisticated or lay audience because they
are understandable to the average reader, causing him to trust the communicator and
33 JOAN MULHOLLAND, HANDBOOK OF PERSUASIVE TACTICS: A PRACTICAL LANGUAGE
GUIDE 183 (1994).
34 See JOANNA THORNBORROW & SHÂN WAREING, PATTERNS IN LANGUAGE: AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO LANGUAGE AND LITERARY STYLE 96–97 (1998).
35 See id. at 97.
36 Id.
37 See id. (explaining that using the metaphor of horses to describe a forest in an Emily
Dickinson poem introduces movement, strength, and wildness—characteristics of horses—
into the forest).
38 See BOSMAJIAN, supra note 12, at 41 (citing SEATTLE TIMES, May 12, 1984).
39 See MULHOLLAND, supra note 33, at 184.
40 See id.
41 See id. at 185.
42 See id. at 183.
43 See The Internet, Communication, and www.nytimes.com, http://www.lcc.gatech.edu
/~herrington/gcp/Political/Gore_Political.htm [https://perma.cc/2WEC-5P3H].
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identify with him.44 In this way, colloquialisms are useful in simplifying complex
issues. Colloquialisms also develop rapport between a communicator and his
audience since they may be viewed as a sign of shared experience.45 Further, col-
loquialisms discourage analysis or criticism of the issue at hand; their use of familiar
words are effective in sweeping the reader along without recognizing that the issue
may be more complicated than it seems.46 In the same way, colloquialisms serve to
dismiss the importance of an opponent’s arguments because they simplify the issues
and indicate that they are barely worth mentioning.47 For example, if one communi-
cator responds to another in saying, “Don’t have a cow, man,”48 he effectively dis-
misses his opponent’s objections as trivial. At the same time, the communicator may
develop rapport with other audience members since they are familiar with the phrase
and thus share it with the communicator. One danger of using colloquialisms is that
their effect on certain audiences is to some extent unpredictable; their meanings are
incorporated into the specific audience’s worldview and thus may communicate
unintended connotations.49 Additionally, colloquialisms may be unpersuasive to
audiences who despise their unsophisticated nature and lose respect for the commu-
nicator for using them.50
C. Humor
Humor is also an effective rhetorical device. Some of the purposes of humor
include lightening the mood of an interaction, enhancing a social relationship with
the audience, drawing in the audience, and presenting oneself well.51 Humor is also
effective in dismissing an opponent or his case.52 According to Mulholland, using
humor well communicates to the audience that the speaker is worth listening to,
beyond the humor, and is likely to be correct in his assessments.53 The speaker’s
intelligence will be manifest if his use of humor is not only relevant and witty, but
also illuminating—presenting an idea that makes an important contribution to the
communication.54 To be most effective, though, humor should be a play on ideas,
44 See id.
45 See MULHOLLAND, supra note 33, at 340 (describing the use of colloquialisms—or
“slogans”—in the context of marketing).
46 See id. at 126.
47 See The Internet, Communication, and www.nytimes.com, supra note 43.
48 This phrase was popularized by the character of Bart Simpson on the cartoon The
Simpsons. See “Don’t Have a Cow, Man,” Quotes, SHMOOP, http://www.shmoop.com/quotes
/dont-have-a-cow-man.html [https://perma.cc/T8QQ-97UD].
49 See MULHOLLAND, supra note 33, at 340.
50 See id.
51 See id. at 126.
52 See id.
53 See id. at 126–27.
54 See id. at 127.
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not just word play.55 “Humor is powerfully persuasive if it generates shared
amusement or laughter, particularly if it can remind [the audience] of things shared
with [the speaker] . . . .”—if it can establish, “common ground” and suggest that the
audience and the speaker “are likely to share views.”56 If this is accomplished, the
audience might conclude that it should agree with the speaker’s communication.57
Humor can also be used to set up alliances and oppositions by separating those who
share the laughter from those who do not.58 Further, it can be persuasive by relaxing
the audience and hampering their discovery of some detail that they might oppose.59
Moreover, humor may be used to destroy the opposition’s credibility since laughing
at the opposition suggests that it is not worth serious attention.60
While humor can be incredibly persuasive, it may also be a dangerous tactic.61
If the communicator contributes only humor to the dialogue, it may suggest that he
is uncomfortable with the subject or that he has nothing else to say.62 Additionally,
the communicator may be viewed as arrogant,63 or the humor might be viewed as an
avoidance device.64 Further, Mulholland argues that written humor is “always prob-
lematic” since the communicator has no way of determining his audience’s mood
and cannot take account of the audience’s characteristics or situation.65
III. JUSTICE SCALIA’S APPROACH
Rhetorical stratagems like the metaphor, colloquialisms, and humor can be power-
fully persuasive devices, yet it is surprisingly rare that Supreme Court Justices make
use of them. Unlike the other Justices, Justice Scalia, throughout his time on the
Court, made regular use of such devices—especially metaphors, colloquialisms, and
humor.66 Justice Scalia’s opinions have employed rhetoric to a greater extent than
those of his colleagues. His use of metaphors exhibited his intelligence and creativ-
ity, and served to form a bond with many of his readers. His use of colloquialisms
was effective in communicating with a lay audience and again establishing rapport
with them. Justice Scalia also had a great sense of humor, which is reflected in his
opinions. This served to make his opinions memorable and drew in audiences who
might otherwise have been uninterested in reading judicial opinions.
55 See id.
56 Id.
57 See id. 
58 See id.
59 See id. According to Mulholland, “[i]t is wise to note when humor occurs, and what
in the immediate context it might be intended to hide.” Id.
60 See id.
61 See id. at 128.
62 See id.
63 See id.
64 See id.
65 See id.
66 See infra Parts III.A–C.
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A. Justice Scalia’s Use of Metaphors
Justice Scalia made use of metaphors in many of his opinions.67 Such metaphors
appear to arise most often when he was writing for himself, either in concurrence
or dissent, instead of in a majority opinion.68 Further, when they appeared in his
concurrences instead of dissents, Scalia tended to disagree altogether with the
majority’s reasoning. For example, perhaps Scalia’s most famous metaphor was his
comparison of the Court’s Lemon test,69 which is used to determine whether there
has been an unconstitutional establishment of religion, to a haunting ghoul:
Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits
up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed
and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence
once again, frightening the little children and . . . attorneys . . . .
Over the years, however, no fewer than five of the currently
sitting Justices have, in their own opinions, personally driven
pencils through the creature’s heart . . . .
The secret of the Lemon test’s survival, I think, is that it is so
easy to kill. It is there to scare us (and our audience) when we wish
it to do so, but we can command it to return to the tomb at will.70
While here Scalia was in concurrence with the majority, he agreed solely with the
outcome of the case.71 He disagreed with the Court’s reasoning, stating that he
would “decline to apply Lemon”72 and that he disagreed with the Court’s inquiry as
to whether the school district’s practice signaled endorsement of religion.73
67 Justice Scalia’s use of metaphors traces back to his first published article, which pre-
dated his appointment to the Supreme Court. See Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Non-
statutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: Some Conclusions from the Public-Lands
Cases, 68 MICH. L. REV. 867, 867 (1970). For example, he compared the Court to a tight-rope
walker walking the line for the first time and carrying a balancing stick. See id. at 879.
68 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 70–73.
69 The Lemon test is a three-pronged test the Court sometimes uses to determine whether
a statute violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by having a purpose of
establishing religion, having the effect of doing so, or requiring excessive entanglement
between the government and religion. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
70 Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398–99 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
71 See id. at 397–98 (agreeing with the Court’s conclusion but disagreeing with the
Court’s application of the Lemon test and with the Court’s inquiry as to whether the school
district’s practice signaled endorsement of religion in general).
72 Id. at 399.
73 See id. at 400.
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Justice Scalia’s ghoul metaphor is effective in injecting into the concept of the
Lemon test qualities of terror and haunting persistence. However, the metaphor also
conveys the notion of immortality, which is peculiar since Scalia wanted to irrevers-
ibly kill the ghoul. Thus, the audience is left with a feeling of helplessness that
Lemon will persist, despite any of the Justices’ actions. This seems contrary to
Scalia’s desire to abandon the Lemon test in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
His opinion does not seem to serve the usual purposes of a concurrence—to explain
how the Court could have otherwise rationalized or to give a clear signal to lower
courts as to what actions they should take in Establishment Clause cases.74 However,
the extensive ghoul analogy is effective in creating powerful imagery that causes an
audience to remember this Scalia concurrence. It also may be effective in creating
a bond between Scalia and his audience, since the public can share a laugh at the
Court’s expense. The metaphor likely did not gain favor with the Court, however.
Instead, the metaphor pokes fun at the Court’s inconsistency and thus could erode
the public’s respect for the judiciary. It seems, then, that this metaphor was con-
structed to persuade an audience other than Justice Scalia’s colleagues.
In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board,75 Justice Scalia again used some powerful imagery—this time in his majority
opinion that overruled the Court’s earlier case of Parden v. Terminal Railway.76
Justice Breyer had argued that Parden had been supported by more recent cases, or
at least that the Court had carefully avoided overruling the case.77 This would favor
observing, rather than overruling, Parden. Vehemently disagreeing, Justice Scalia
responded by arguing that
[c]alling what a prior case has flatly decided a ‘question’ in need
of ‘deciding,’ and . . . making it clear that we ‘intimat[e] no
view’ as to whether the answer given . . . was correct, surely was
handwriting on the wall which even an inept cryptologist would
recognize as spelling out the caption of today’s opinion.78
In other words, Justice Scalia contended that it was obvious that Parden should be
overruled. Similar to the ghoul analogy in Lemon, this vivid metaphor is a memora-
ble one. Again, Scalia may have shared a laugh with the public here, as well as
perhaps with the Justices who signed onto the majority opinion, but his metaphor
came at the expense of fellow Justices. It did not act to safeguard their collegial
relationship, nor was it likely to persuade them to join Scalia in future opinions.
74 See supra text accompanying notes 25–27.
75 527 U.S. 666 (1999), overruling Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
76 377 U.S. 184 (1964), overruled by Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 666.
77 See Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 678 n.2.
78 Id.
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Some of Scalia’s other famous metaphors—such as comparing the presentation
of separation-of-powers issues to the Court to a wolf in sheep’s clothing,79 or
analogizing the Court’s implication that you can make one valid proposition out of
two invalid ones to hopping back and forth between two vessels in trying to stay
afloat80—appear in his dissents. Here, too, he was in substantial disagreement with
the Court and used the metaphors to form a bond with the public instead of his
colleagues. Although perhaps successful in causing the public to better identify with
his view, Scalia’s dissents serve to ridicule the Court.81 While they demonstrate
flaws in the majority’s analysis as dissents should, they jeopardize collegiality and
confidence in the judiciary, which is contrary to Justice Ginsburg’s characterization
of effective dissents.82
B. Justice Scalia’s Use of Colloquialisms
Justice Scalia has also regularly made use of colloquialisms, which have
functioned to establish rapport with the public.83 In his concurrence in Bank One
Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co.,84 for example, Justice Scalia argued
79 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Frequently
an issue of this sort will come before the Court clad, so to speak, in sheep’s clothing . . . . But
this wolf comes as a wolf.”). For a detailed analysis of this metaphor, see Yury Kapgan, Of
Golf and Ghouls: The Prose Style of Justice Scalia, 9 LEGAL WRITING J. 71, 74–76 (2003).
80 See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 685 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia wrote:
When the vessel labeled “corruption” begins to founder under weight
too great to be logically sustained, the argumentation jumps to the good
ship “special privilege”; and when that in turn begins to go down, it
returns to “corruption.” Thus hopping back and forth between the two,
the argumentation may survive but makes no headway towards port,
where its conclusion waits in vain.
Id.
81 In Morrison v. Olson, Scalia accused the Court of not recognizing the importance of
the separation-of-powers issue even though in this instance the “wolf comes as a wolf.” 487
U.S. at 699, 703–04. In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, Scalia ridiculed his
colleagues’ analysis in charging them with attempting “to make one valid proposition out of
two invalid ones.” 494 U.S. at 685.
82 See supra text accompanying note 30.
83 Justice Scalia used similar tactics in appealing to a lay audience in his address before
the Federal Communications Bar Association in 1972. He appealed to the familiar in kicking
off his speech with a children’s rhyme:
Mother may I go out to swim?
Yes, my darling daughter.
Hang your clothes on the hickory limb,
But don’t go near the water.
Antonin Scalia, Don’t Go Near the Water, 25 FED. COMM. L.J. 111, 112 (1972).
84 516 U.S. 264 (1996).
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that the Court had created “a fiction of Jack-and-the-Beanstalk proportions” in re-
lying, at least in part, on the drafting history of a statute.85 Remaining true to his
view that legislative history is useless,86 Scalia argued that, even if the Court should
inquire into the subjective intent of the legislature in passing the law, to presume the
legislators were keenly aware of the statute’s drafting history is simply a fiction.87
Scalia has made use of colloquialisms in other contexts as well. His use of such
phrases include: “balance-all-the-factors-and-who-knows-who-will-win litigation,”88
“throw-in-the-towel approach,”89 “we’ll-look-at-all-the-circumstances-and-see-if-it-
looks-dangerous approach,”90 “an I-told-you-so mood,”91 “catch-as-catch-can ap-
proach,”92 “whatever-it-takes proabortion jurisprudence,”93 “give-it-a-try litigation,”94
and “keep-what-you-want-and-throw-away-the-rest version.”95 Additionally, Scalia
invoked the common saying of “[g]ood fences make good neighbors” in his majority
opinion of Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.96 These common phrases are understand-
able to lay audiences and represent a shared experience between the audience and
a Supreme Court Justice. Scalia’s colleagues, however, likely did not appreciate this
depreciation and simplification of the issues. While Scalia’s rhetoric is effective in
dismissing his opponents’ arguments as unworthy, this did not aid Scalia in achiev-
ing an opinion that was sensitive to both his colleagues’ views and the litigants of
85 Bank One Chi., N.A., 516 U.S. at 279 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
86 See, e.g., Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 519 U.S. 465, 480–81 (1997)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that he joined in all parts of the majority’s opinion “except those
portions of the opinion [discussing legislative history], which achieve nothing useful and sow
confusion in the law”); see also Bradley C. Karkkainen, “Plain Meaning”: Justice Scalia’s
Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 405 (1994)
(“Justice Scalia’s most familiar and recurrent theme is that, in interpreting a statute, the Court
should look first to the plain meaning of the statutory text rather than seeking guidance from
legislative history.”); Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the
Supreme Court, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 205, 206 (2000) (“Led by Justice Scalia, textualists
fought reliance by the Court on legislative history . . . .”).
87 See Bank One Chi., N.A., 516 U.S. at 279 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
88 Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 711 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
89 Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 486 n.9 (1990).
90 Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 180 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
91 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 955 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
92 Crandon, 494 U.S. at 180 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
93 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 762 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
94 Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 551 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
95 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 993 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part). For more examples of Scalia’s use of “adjectival
catch phrase[s] connected by hyphens,” see Kapgan, supra note 79, at 81–82.
96 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995).
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the case. Thus, again, Justice Scalia seemed to write primarily to the public, not his
colleagues on the Court.
C. Justice Scalia’s Use of Humor
Justice Scalia was probably most famous for his wit. His comparison of the
Lemon test to a ghoul97 is indicative of the humor he thrust into his opinions.98 In the
ghoul description, Justice Scalia was successful in lightening the mood and enhanc-
ing his relationship with the public through shared laughter. He exploited humor’s
ability to set up alliances and oppositions by separating those who laughed from
those who did not. He formed an alliance with the public and consequently directly
opposed his colleagues. Although this may seem natural because he did not com-
pletely agree with the majority opinion, Justice Scalia broke Justice Ginsburg’s rule
of maintaining collegiality with his colleagues and maintaining respect for the
judiciary.99 He undermined his colleagues’ credibility, as well as that of the Court,
which made his argument more persuasive but damaged his own relationship with
the Court and respect for the Court as an institution.
Another example of Justice Scalia’s good sense of humor occurred in his
majority opinion in College Savings Bank.100 There, in attacking the dissent’s loose
view of federalism—that legislative flexibility is the only counter needed to maintain
the balance between federal and state powers—he quipped: “Legislative flexibility on
the part of Congress will be the touchstone of federalism when the capacity to sup-
port combustion becomes the acid test of a fire extinguisher.”101 This humor, while
lightening the mood somewhat, was again dripping with criticism. It served to
further separate the majority and the public from the dissenters by mocking the
dissenters’ reasoning. In ridiculing his colleagues, Justice Scalia set up a situation
where he was likely to be isolated on the Court in future opinions.
IV. CRITICISM OF THE COURT
Justice Scalia did more than effectively employ rhetorical stratagems; he
generally layered them with a veneer of criticism. As Professor Richard Brisbin, Jr.
has explained, although Scalia was “[a]t times engaging and witty in his criticism,
97 See supra text accompanying notes 70–74.
98 It has been rumored that Justice Scalia’s clerks initially drafted his opinions, but once
Scalia was through with them, they had metamorphosed from a typical Justice’s opinion to
one laced with side-splitting humor. See Nina Totenberg, Skip the Legalese and Keep It
Short, Justices Say, NPR (June 13, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/2011/06/13/1370
36622/skip-the-legalese-and-keep-it-short-justices-say [https://perma.cc/H85L-7TVS].
99 See supra text accompanying note 30.
100 Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
101 Id. at 690.
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he has at other times been sarcastic, barbed, and demeaning in his comments about
the legal analysis of his colleagues and the legal work of Congress and administra-
tive agencies.”102 Indeed, Scalia was the best-known attacker of his Supreme Court
colleagues;103 he often expressed contempt for his judicial colleagues and insulted
them, using sarcasm and name-calling.104 As Professor Philip Cooper has suggested,
Scalia did not seem constrained by the notion that the Justices should maintain a
sense of civility on the Court.105
Justice Scalia’s pervasive criticism can be seen with his uses of metaphors,
colloquialisms, and humor. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,106 for example, the
majority stated that “[l]iberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”107 Justice
Scalia played on these words in his dissent, stating that “[r]eason finds no refuge in
this jurisprudence of confusion.”108 He mirrored the majority’s language to achieve
a humorous and persuasive effect but also undercut the merit of the majority’s
opinion. Regardless of the rhetorical device employed, Justice Scalia seemed to have
the primary purpose of attacking the Court head-on.
More striking, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,109 Scalia wrote a
stinging concurrence, attacking Justice O’Connor personally.110 He indicated that
O’Connor had hypocritically contradicted herself by stating that judicial restraint
prevents the Court from reconsidering and overruling Roe v. Wade111 while she had
written opinions reconsidering and overturning precedents in other areas of settled
law.112 Scalia also stated that O’Connor was “irrational” in introducing a concept of
possible viability in Roe: “[s]ince ‘viability’ means the mere possibility (not the
certainty) of survivability outside the womb, ‘possible viability’ must mean the
possibility of a possibility of survivability outside the womb.”113 Justice Scalia even
went a step further by mockingly stating that “[p]erhaps our next opinion will expand
[the concept] even further, by approving state action designed to take account of ‘the
chance of possible viability.’”114 According to Cooper, the concurrence had little
102 RICHARD A. BRISBIN, JR., JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE CONSERVATIVE REVIVAL
1 (1997).
103 See PHILLIP J. COOPER, BATTLES ON THE BENCH: CONFLICT INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT 63 (1995).
104 See Marie A. Failinger, Not Mere Rhetoric: On Wasting or Claiming Your Legacy,
Justice Scalia, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 425, 475 (2003).
105 See COOPER, supra note 103, at 124.
106 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
107 Id. at 844.
108 Id. at 993 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
109 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
110 See COOPER, supra note 103, at 49.
111 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
112 See Webster, 492 U.S. at 532–34 (Scalia, J., concurring).
113 Id. at 536.
114 Id.
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purpose other than to ridicule Justice Scalia’s colleague.115 Not only would such an
attack affect Scalia’s relationship with Justice O’Connor in particular, but it could
have jeopardized his relationship with the entire Court. Further, his criticism likely
damaged both the Court’s authority and his own.116
Justice Scalia’s frequent resort to criticism is in contrast to other styles of
persuasion employed by Justices known for their powers of persuasion. Justice
Douglas, for example was “a real charmer” when appealing for modifications to
proposed opinions.117 Justice Frankfurter could be abrupt and irritating, but he tem-
pered his criticisms by poking fun at his own academic proclivities.118 Justice Scalia
has instead distinguished himself by being extremely critical of his colleagues and
the Court.119 Although Scalia proved himself capable of constructing brilliant and
elaborate metaphors and producing hearty chuckles, it is questionable whether his
frequent use of these rhetorical stratagems worked to his advantage in persuading
the Court. In contrast to his charming public personality,120 Justice Scalia’s judicial
demeanor exhibited in his opinions was often quite caustic.
115 See COOPER, supra note 103, at 50.
116 See Failinger, supra note 104, at 493. Some have argued that the proliferation of
individual opinions since the 1930s and 1940s has come at the cost of consensus on the
Court’s policymaking—that it has undercut the Court’s rulings and policymaking abilities
and has made the Court appear more fragmented and less predictable. See O’BRIEN, supra
note 16, at 295, 302. Yet concurrences and dissents are justifiable as improving the majority
opinion and augmenting the prestige of the Court since it is comforting to look back and see
that at least some of the Justices got it right. See id. at 313. Concurring and dissenting opin-
ions also keep the Court at the forefront of the intellectual development of the law. See id.
117 SUSAN LOW BLOCH & THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER, SUPREME COURT POLITICS: THE
INSTITUTION AND ITS PROCEDURES 396 (1994).
118 See id. at 396–97.
119 See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of Statutory Interpre-
tation: Comparing Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law, 58 DUKE
L.J. 1231, 1291 (2009) (“Since joining the Court, Justice Scalia has regularly criticized his
colleagues for relying on legislative history in their majority opinions.”); David Marcus,
Institutions and an Interpretive Methodology for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2011
UTAH L. REV. 927, 928 (“Justice Antonin Scalia has famously issued opinions for years in
which he criticizes his colleagues for their reliance on legislative history in statutory
interpretation.”); David S. Schwartz, Justice Scalia’s Jiggery-Pokery in Federal Arbitration
Law, 101 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 75, 75 (2016) (noting Scalia’s “penchant for criticizing
his colleagues for judicial practices in which he frequently indulged himself”). But see
Failinger, supra note 104, at 431–32 (stating that Scalia’s colleagues have followed his
example in “call[ing] each other out” in their opinions).
120 See William K. Kelley, Justice Antonin Scalia and the Long Game, 80 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1601, 1601 (2012) (“When President Reagan nominated D.C. Circuit Judge Antonin
Scalia to the Supreme Court in 1986, commentators noted that his gregarious and charming
personality was an important strength of the nomination, because the new Justice could be
expected to charm his way to influence on the Court.”); Nadine Strossen, Tribute to Justice
Antonin Scalia, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1, 9 (2006) (“Nino Scalia’s warm and ebul-
lient personality has won him many friends, across the ideological spectrum.”).
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V. WRITING FOR A DIFFERENT KIND OF AUDIENCE
Even though Justice Scalia was accomplished in employing rhetorical devices,
his overt criticisms of the Court and his colleagues likely impaired his ability to
persuade the Court to join his opinions. Thus it might appear that his attempts to
persuade were all for naught. But perhaps Justice Scalia was directing his rhetoric
at a different kind of audience. Instead of aiming his words at the Court, it appears
that Scalia directed his persuasive tactics at the general public.
A. Justice Scalia Was Ineffective in Persuading the Court
Although Justice Scalia’s views may not have been adopted by the Court
because of their conservative nature,121 Scalia’s persuasive power also was likely
ineffective because of his sharp criticisms of the Court and his colleagues.122 These
criticisms, and the stridency of Scalia’s opinions, likely damaged Scalia’s ability to
directly persuade his colleagues.123 While Scalia easily pointed out holes in his
opponents’ arguments, he did so with such fervor that the collegial relationship be-
tween other members of the Court and him may have subsequently eroded. Scalia’s
colleagues were understandably offended by his personal attacks and assaults on the
Court.124 For example, even though, politically, they were not far apart, Justice
Powell found Scalia irritating because of his cheerful lack of deference, his dis-
missal of conventional wisdom, and also his wit.125 It is likely that Justice O’Connor
was even more deeply offended by Scalia’s attack on her in Webster.126 The Justices
probably held this against Scalia when he attempted to persuade them to see cases
from his point of view. Likely due to his hankering for criticism, Scalia’s rhetoric
was often ineffective in marshalling the Court.127
Justice Scalia’s numerous attempts to persuade his Supreme Court colleagues
seem to have failed.128 Despite Scalia’s employment of familiar rhetorical tools to
draw in and persuade his audience, he has related being disappointed in not carrying
121 For example, Scalia was an avid originalist, taking a minority approach to constitutional
interpretation. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW (1997) (outlining and defending the originalist approach).
122 See JAMES B. STAAB, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA: A
HAMILTONIAN ON THE SUPREME COURT 318 (2006). In addition to not effectively persuading
the Court, Scalia’s use of criticism jeopardized his chances of becoming Chief Justice because
his opinions demonstrated that he had difficulty working with the other Justices—regardless
of whether this was true in fact.
123 See Horace E. Johns, Nine Means to an End, 39 TENN. B.J. 27, 33 (2003).
124 See id. (noting that Scalia’s fervent advocacy sometimes offended his colleagues).
125 See COOPER, supra note 103, at 113.
126 See supra text accompanying notes 109–16.
127 See Johns, supra note 123, at 31.
128 But see Failinger, supra note 104, at 468 (stating that the Court is not the most im-
portant audience of judicial opinions).
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the majority in a number of important cases, and a significant number of his opin-
ions are in dissent.129 Further, not only did Scalia’s views remain unpopular with his
liberal colleagues, but his conservative colleagues on the Court were often similarly
unpersuaded by Scalia.130 According to scholars, conservatives’ hopes that Scalia’s
appointment to the Court would solidify a conservative coalition were dashed.131
With this lack of persuasive power, Justice Scalia was not generally effective in
sending the Court in directions he would have liked it to take. His “personal crusade
to persuade his colleagues to abandon . . . legislative history,”132 for example, was
not realized during his time on the Court.133 In terms of persuading his colleagues,
his utilization of criticism and rhetorical stratagems seems to have been ineffective.
B. Justice Scalia Directed His Rhetoric at the General Public
Instead of directing his rhetorical efforts at the Court, Justice Scalia appears to
have been aiming his efforts at the general public.134 His use of metaphors, colloqui-
alisms, and humor all serve to create rapport with his audience. While they probably
were not effective in creating rapport with his colleagues, they likely still serve this
purpose with respect to his alternative audience. Since metaphors and colloquialisms
are useful in simplifying complex issues, they are especially useful in communicat-
ing legal concepts to non-lawyers.135 Thus, these rhetorical stratagems would have
been particularly useful if Scalia was attempting to persuade the general public
instead of his colleagues on the Court. Further, those who are not well-versed in the
law are likely more easily distracted by Scalia’s rhetorical maneuvering, causing
them to focus not so much on his reasoning, but instead on his brilliant way with
words. This allowed Scalia to gloss over precedent and avoid addressing any deficits
that might have existed in his own legal reasoning. Finally, Scalia’s use of meta-
phors, colloquialisms, and humor made his opinions memorable and easy to read for
129 According to the Supreme Court Database, approximately 255 of Scalia’s 734 opinions
were in dissent. See The Supreme Court Database, WASH. U. L., http://scdb.wustl.edu/analysis
.php [https://perma.cc /JL42-HGX6].
130 See Kapgan, supra note 79, at 97–98.
131 See BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, SCALIA: A COURT OF ONE 219 (2014); Kristi Kress
Wilhelmy, Comment, Breaking Scalia’s Silence: The Dissent Justice Scalia Might Have
Written in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 34
U. TOL. L. REV. 611, 636 & n.236 (2003).
132 See CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE SUPREME COURT’S
CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT 37 (1993).
133 See, e.g., Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016) (indicating
that reliance on legislative history is sometimes appropriate); Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz.
Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2669 (2015) (relying in part on legislative
history); Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2096 (2015) (discerning congressional intent
from a statute’s text and legislative history).
134 Professor Failinger stated that Justice Scalia’s most important audience was the public.
See Failinger, supra note 104, at 472.
135 See generally id. (discussing Scalia’s use of metaphors).
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those who do not consume Supreme Court opinions on a daily basis. Their lack of
legal jargon and amusing quips make it easier for audiences to drudge through legal
opinions that, if written by other judges, might otherwise be dry and unentertaining.
Justice Scalia was successful in drawing in the general public. His colorful
language in his judicial opinions seem to be more often quoted by the popular press
than any of his colleagues.136 Further, while few members of the public who are not
judges, attorneys, or law school students, regularly read actual judicial opinions,137
Scalia’s opinions are so popular that they have been the subject of several books,
one of which is completely filled with his most famous dissents.138 From the plenti-
ful media attention these books have received, they appear to be popular among the
general public, not just legal scholars.139 Even President Obama, who sits at the
opposite end of the political spectrum, has spoken well of Justice Scalia and his
judicial opinions, describing Scalia as a “brilliant legal mind with an energetic style,
incisive wit, and colorful opinions.”140 Finally, Scalia’s opinions have generated
more law review articles than any of his colleagues because they are so provocative
and employ such colorful language.141 Thus it seems that Justice Scalia has been
effective in reaching, and perhaps even persuading, the general public.
136 See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Religious Access to Schools Widened, WASH. POST, June 8,
1993, at A01 (quoting Justice Scalia’s language in Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring), which compares the Lemon
test to a ghoul).
137 See Kapgan, supra note 79, at 100 (“The general populace surely never read court
opinions, except for what quotes they glean from a newspaper.”).
138 See generally KEVIN A. RING, SCALIA DISSENTS: WRITINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S
WITTIEST, MOST OUTSPOKEN JUSTICE (2004) (boasting some of Scalia’s most colorful
language from his dissents in cases such as United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 569
(1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting), where he argued that the majority’s assertion that the traditions
of having government-funded military schools for men and sending only men into military
combat was unconstitutional, was “politics-smuggled-into-law”).
139 See, e.g., Interview by Renee Giachino with Kevin Ring, author of Scalia Dissents,
CTR. FOR INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (Dec. 1, 2004), http://www.cfif.org/htdocs/freedomline/cur
rent/in_our_opinion/scalia-dissents.htm [https://perma.cc/WJ4B-46F7]; Interview by Jamie
Glazov with Kevin Ring, author of Scalia Dissents, FRONT PAGE MAGAZINE (Dec. 1, 2004),
http://frontpagemag.com/Articles/Printable.asp?ID=16012 [https://perma.cc/L25H-7HMA];
see also RING, supra note 138, at Back Flap (featuring a statement by Tom DeLay).
140 See Krishnadev Calamur, Obama’s Views on Antonin Scalia—and the Justice’s
Successor, ATLANTIC (Feb. 13, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02
/justice-scalia-obama/462747/ [http://perma.cc/5R5R-D52M]; see also RING, supra note 138,
at Back Flap (stating that “Scalia [was] the most principled conservative jurist” of his time
and that a great service has been done in compiling his extraordinary judicial opinions).
141 See Alice Koskela, Scalia Shows Textualists Have a Sense of Humor, 43 ADVOC. 31,
31 (2000); see also JOAN BISKUPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL: THE LIFE AND CONSTITUTION OF
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 276 (2009) (stating that, at least in 2004, Scalia
was “the subject of academic law review articles” more frequently than his fellow Justices
on the Supreme Court).
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VI. WRITING A LEGACY
The question remains of why Justice Scalia focused his persuasive efforts on the
general public instead of his Supreme Court colleagues. It is possible that Scalia’s
rhetorical flourishes were designed merely to flaunt his own intelligence. Justice
Scalia’s language, however, seems more directed. While his intent appears to have
been leaving an impact on the law, it seems not to have been the simple intent of
leaving a legacy of brilliant language. It appears that Scalia had grander plans of
shaping the law through a bottom-up approach instead of through the traditional
manner of molding the law in a trickle-down fashion.
A. Writing to Parade His Rhetorical Might?
It seems that Justice Scalia may have been trying to leave his legacy with his
language. Professor Marie Failinger has asserted that Scalia wrote to illustrate his
“intellectual superiority” and his “contempt for others.”142 According to Failinger,
Scalia arduously searched for the language that would most infuriate his opponents,
causing controversy and throwing him into the spotlight.143 Further, it sometimes
seems that Scalia may have authored a dissent just for the sake of publishing his
work of metaphors, colloquialisms, and humor. Perhaps Scalia hoped to follow
Justice Holmes’s path to becoming a great dissenter, eventually changing the minds
of his colleagues or future Supreme Court Justices.144 According to Judge Posner,
Holmes’s reputation as a great dissenter was primarily due to his effective use of
rhetoric, not his sound reasoning.145 Scalia indeed mirrored Justice Holmes in his
rhetoric, making similar use of both the metaphor and colloquialisms.146 But Scalia
departed from Holmes’s example in vehemently attacking the Court and personally
attacking his colleagues.147
Justice Scalia’s surplusage of rhetoric might be attributed to his own arrogance.
He may have been just showing off his verbal agility to his general public audience. If
this was his goal, then Scalia was successful, being touted as “[v]ery bright,”148 “bril-
liant yet opinionated,”149 having “impressive intellect,”150 and being “an articulate
142 Failinger, supra note 104, at 426.
143 See id.
144 The dissents that Holmes wrote during his time on the bench have since become
doctrine in many instances. See THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES xiii (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992).
145 See id. at xvii.
146 See id. at xiii.
147 See supra Part IV.
148 BRISBIN, supra note 102, at 1.
149 DAVID A. SCHULTZ & CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, THE JURISPRUDENTIAL VISION OF JUSTICE
ANTONIN SCALIA xvii (1996).
150 Id. at xiii.
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spokesperson.”151 Senate minority leader Harry Reid has even noted that Scalia was
“one smart guy” with well-written and well-reasoned opinions.152 It appears that
Scalia recognized his success, for in his defense of filing dissenting opinions, Scalia
seemed to applaud himself:
When history demonstrates that one of the Court’s decisions has
been a truly horrendous mistake, it is comforting—and condu-
cive of respect for the Court—to look back and realize that at
least some of the Justices saw the danger clearly, and gave voice,
often eloquent voice, to their concern.153
If displaying his brilliance was his only goal, Scalia turned out to be quite successful
in this regard.
B. Shaping the Law Through a Bottom-Up Approach
Justice Scalia may have had grander aspirations in mind. His rhetoric appears
to have been more targeted than to merely flex his verbal muscles. While filled with
colorful metaphors, catchy colloquialisms, and side-splitting humor, Scalia’s opinions
go beyond entertaining and fascinating his audiences. His calculated criticisms of the
Court and his colleagues indicate that beyond writing well, he hoped to make an im-
pact on the law. It seems that Scalia was attempting to persuade his select audience—
the general public—to agree with his judicial reasoning. Since he probably realized
that he was unlikely to persuade his colleagues, Justice Scalia turned his back on
them and instead aimed his rhetoric at the general public in hope of changing the
law using a bottom-up approach.154
The traditional view of the Supreme Court is that of nine unbiased judges who
are insulated from political pressure in handing down the law.155 This law is derived
either from the Constitution or the U.S. Code, or it is judge-created common law. The
Justices interpret the law and record their interpretations in judicial opinions. Lower
courts then follow Supreme Court precedent in determining how cases in each juris-
diction should be decided. Thus, Supreme Court Justices are powerful characters;
they are integral to shaping the law.
151 Id. at xiv. Indeed, Justice Scalia has been “lavishly praised (by friends and foes alike)
for [his] intellectual talents and abilities.” STAAB, supra note 122, at 310.
152 See Dems’ New Senate Leader Criticizes Justice Thomas, CNN.COM (Dec. 6, 2004,
3:48 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/12/05/judges.reid.frist/index.html [http://
perma.cc/RY3P-YTGW].
153 O’BRIEN, supra note 16, at 313 (emphasis added) (quoting Justice Scalia).
154 See supra Part V.
155 See O’BRIEN, supra note 16, at 29. This is of course an overly simplified view of the Court,
and many have argued that the Justices are biased and also affected by political pressure.
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Under this trickle-down approach, Justice Scalia could frequently not get his
way because he was unable to persuade his colleagues to vote in his favor. Under-
standably, then, he was often frustrated with the Court for regularly not agreeing
with him.156 In 1999, Fortune Magazine reported that the Court risked losing Scalia
due to this frustration.157 Apparently Scalia had told his associates that he was
“underchallenged” by the light workload of the Court and that he was tired of always
dissenting.158 His friends described him as “frustrated” and reported that he had
indicated that press accounts speculating about the next Justices to retire were wrong
to omit him.159 Other observers similarly noted that Scalia had become increasingly
caustic and dissatisfied.160 And his frustration from not getting his way on the bench
built increasingly throughout the years.161
It seems that Scalia understood that he would often not be persuasive to his
colleagues, so perhaps he believed the bottom-up approach was his best opportunity
to make an impact. Justice Scalia bucked the trend of attempting to persuade his
colleagues. Perhaps he felt he could not directly persuade such experienced judges
who were likely set in their ways. Maybe he realized that some of his views were so
far from where the Court stood during Scalia’s time on the bench that the probability
of successfully persuading the Court to make a 180-degree turn in its jurisprudence
was small. Instead, Justice Scalia may have felt that he had a better chance of per-
suading the general public, which could in turn shift the Court’s direction.
Contrary to the traditional trickle-down approach, the law may be shaped in a
bottom-up manner. The general public influences legislatures to codify the public’s
will. Indeed, legislators look to the polls in determining how to vote on a number of
items.162 Further, the general public can have an effect on how constitutions and statutes
are interpreted, and how the common law is shaped. There is evidence that the Court,
at least to some extent, follows public opinion.163 The decision in Roe v. Wade,164 for
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example, has been attributed to this force.165 Particular segments of the public may
have an influence on the Court even if the public at large does not have a strong
opinion on a matter. For example, the Justices occasionally turn to legal scholars,
whose work may have an effect on jurisprudence.166 From the beginning of Justice
Scalia’s career, he recognized that legal scholars play a role in this bottom-up
approach to shaping the law.167 In his first scholarly publication as an associate
professor of law at the University of Virginia, Scalia stated: “It is the inherited
wisdom of the American bar that responsible professional comment and criticism
are the principal restraints upon judicial arbitrariness at the highest level and major
influences in the continuing development of court-made law.”168 Thus, Scalia in-
dicated that legal scholars have influence in the development of common law. Even
when the public lacks expertise in an area, though, it may have an effect on Supreme
Court decisionmaking.169
Justice Scalia seems to have taken a bottom-up approach to persuasion, focusing
his rhetoric on the general public, which could in turn affect legislation and legal
interpretation. By harnessing the power of metaphors, colloquialisms, and humor,
Scalia could easily communicate with and persuade even persons without legal
training. This general public—which also includes legislators,170 practicing lawyers,
legal scholars, and other influential persons—could then impact the Court’s interpre-
tation of law.
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The consequences of employing this bottom-up approach are uncertain since
such an approach is sui generis. This uncertainty is one disadvantage of trying to
shape the law in this fashion. Currently, it is difficult to determine whether Justice
Scalia was effective in shaping the law from the bottom-up. Perhaps this is because
another disadvantage to the bottom-up approach is that any effect on the law will
likely take longer since popular opinion must work its way up from the masses to
the legislature and the courts. Further, it may take much more rhetorical power in
terms of quantity to effectively reach the general public. Supreme Court Justices are
often isolated in their “marble temple,”171 but Scalia’s approach requires significant
publicity. To be effective, he had to regularly get quoted in newspapers and inspire
others to compile volumes of his most famous opinions. The popular press is in-
tegral to the bottom-up approach’s success. Quality legal reasoning, on the other
hand, may have been less important than the publicity and rhetorical strength of
Scalia’s opinions. Thus, while employing the bottom-up approach has the disadvan-
tage of requiring greater exposure to the public, it likely has the advantage that the
reasoning need not be as superb as it would otherwise have to be if Scalia were
attempting to persuade his careful colleagues. This is merely because Scalia’s new
audience was less well versed in the law, allowing him to gloss over precedent and
certain consequences of his judicial reasoning.
CONCLUSION
During the course of his life, Justice Scalia seems to have mastered his use of
rhetorical devices. His metaphors were colorful and memorable, his colloquialisms
were understandable to lay audiences, and his use of humor was effective in dismiss-
ing his opponents’ arguments.172 In employing each of these stratagems, Justice
Scalia directed his opinions primarily at the general public, including legislators,
practicing lawyers, legal scholars, and other influential persons. Based on Scalia’s
criticisms, which overlaid his use of rhetorical stratagems, however, it seems that his
colleagues on the Court were not an audience Scalia hoped to persuade, at least in
the first instance. By appearing inflexible and disrespectful in his opinions, Justice
Scalia risked isolating himself from the rest of the Court and often finding himself
alone in his reasoning. His rhetorical skills were thus ineffective in directly com-
manding the Court in a direction more to his liking. It appears Scalia dismissed this
opportunity to persuade the Court and thus shape the law. He instead employed a
unique bottom-up approach in attempting to accomplish this objective. Through the
power of public opinion, Justice Scalia hoped to leave his impression on the law.
Only time will tell whether this bottom-up approach to shaping the law was ulti-
mately effective.
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